Feb
01
Thoughts on “privileged” groups
February 1, 2010 – 8:02 pm by MichaelThe argument is that “normalcy” is granted as a privilege to Asian Americans in participation in the math and sciences field (as well as for whites, who are the universal “normal”). And although I believe we can establish that this is unearned for the individual, need I t be so for the category or race as a whole?
If we speak of races, of groups of men acting collectively as a single entity (which of course I do not personally believe in), shouldn’t that entity be subject to any judgments one might pass on them? Do we not do the same for companies we believe practice bad business? We judge the company, despite the fact that it is a collection of men, because it is an entity that acts with a recognizable, cohesive purpose. If any other collection of men also acts with a recognizable, cohesive purpose, what is wrong with judging the group?
So, if this “privilege” is earned for the race, is it possible to pass broad judgment on race without judging individuals? And if so, is it feasible to have laws allowing for judgments on race (ie profiling)?
The answer to the latter is no. Laws apply ultimately to individuals; there is no law that judges a race without judging individuals.
However, this is not true of the social sphere. We are able to distinguish between a person and a group to which that person belongs. Often, we separate an individual, in our mind, from the vague mass that is a group–the individual pops out. Group A may be known for being soft spoken, for example. When we encounter a member M of A who is loud, we have already created a partition. A is distinct. The individual, of course, is able to make another’s judgment on him/her coincide with the other’s judgment on a particular group to which the individual belongs. However, as a rule, we are able and we do consciously judge individuals separate from the group. We do not, for example, judge the employee of a company based on the company’s action, despite the employee’s membership in that group. And if we are able to make such a mental separation, there is not anything stopping us from passing judgment on groups. In fact, if we are able to make this separation, we ought to pass such judgments on entities as they have earned.
The trouble, I suppose, is that in order to pass an accurate judgment on a group, one would need access to some sort of experience covering a broad range of the group. The answer to this is, then, is statistics. In college: admit rates, major percentages, graduation rates. In the workplace: field percentages, administrative position percentages. In crime: prison percentages, relapse rates, arrest and conviction percentages. Et cetera. Via statistics, one can form an educated judgment that is justified, on some level.
Given this, I do not understand how persons can be offended when one notes some statistic. It’s a fact–are you angry at it? Or are you angry that I may be drawing conclusions based on this fact? It depends on the reasonableness of the conclusion right? If a group A is statistically known to be 5 times more likely to display behavior B than all other groups of that class, is it unreasonable to know in one’s head that that person M who I know to be in A is at least statistically 5 times more likely to display B? It would be unreasonable, surely, to “know” in one’s head that that person has in fact displayed that behavior. But can the former statement be reasonably attacked?







